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Abstract
Governments in Europe and around the world amassed vast pharmaceutical stockpiles in anticipation 
of a potentially catastrophic influenza pandemic. Yet the comparatively ‘mild’ course of the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic provoked considerable public controversy around those stockpiles, leading to questions about 
their cost–benefit profile and the commercial interests allegedly shaping their creation, as well as around 
their scientific evidence base. So, how did governments come to view pharmaceutical stockpiling as such 
an indispensable element of pandemic preparedness planning? What are the underlying security rationalities 
that rapidly rendered antivirals such a desirable option for government planners? Drawing upon an in-depth 
reading of Foucault’s notion of a ‘crisis of circulation’, this article argues that the rise of pharmaceutical 
stockpiling across Europe is integral to a governmental rationality of political rule that continuously seeks to 
anticipate myriad circulatory threats to the welfare of populations – including to their overall levels of health. 
Novel antiviral medications such as Tamiflu are such an attractive policy option because they could enable 
governments to rapidly modulate dangerous levels of (viral) circulation during a pandemic, albeit without 
disrupting all the other circulatory systems crucial for maintaining population welfare. Antiviral stockpiles, in 
other words, promise nothing less than a pharmaceutical securing of circulation itself.
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Introduction
Looking back over the first decade of the 21st century, we could be forgiven for thinking that Europe 
was besieged by an epidemic of epidemics. It was the decade in which the United Nations Security 
Council first discussed a health issue (HIV/AIDS) as a threat to international peace and security. It 
was also the decade in which European governments had to contend with the rapid international 
spread of a new coronavirus causing Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). No sooner had 
the threat of SARS dissipated than governments were confronted by a cascade of pandemic flu 
scares – from ‘bird flu’ (H5N1) and ‘swine flu’ (H1N1) through to the more recent human infections 
with H7N9 in China. The battery of virus alerts quickly elevated pandemic preparedness to a top-
level political priority in Europe and beyond. Reflecting this increased threat perception, security 
agendas evolved to explicitly incorporate ‘health security’ as a crucial addition to the portfolio of 
European security policy – frequently ranked on a par with the threat of terrorism.
Yet all the while there was also another, and rather less obvious, ‘epidemic’ sweeping across the 
European continent: an epidemic of pharmaceutical stockpiling. Spurned by intense fears of an 
imminent H5N1 ‘bird flu’ pandemic in 2005, governments across Europe anxiously lined up at the 
gates of pharmaceutical companies in order to place vast orders for scarce antiviral medications 
such as oseltamivir (brand name Tamiflu). Between them, the national governments of Europe 
would expend billions of euros over the next few years amassing new antiviral stockpiles. Yet the 
human pandemic of H5N1 did not materialize, and many public health planners were caught off-
guard when the next pandemic was eventually caused not by H5N1, but by H1N1. As it became 
clear that the course of that new H1N1 pandemic would not nearly match the dire predictions that 
had formed the basis for so many pandemic preparedness plans, an intense public backlash against 
the costly pharmaceutical stockpiles ensued. Do they represent reasonable value for money, given 
the considerable resources expended in their creation and maintenance? Was there undue commer-
cial influence in the decision-making processes to create those stockpiles? How persuasive and 
transparent is the scientific evidence that they would actually work as intended in a pandemic? All 
of these questions, in turn, have prompted yet a third epidemic – an epidemic of detailed reviews, 
exhaustive audits and lengthy hearings into the evolution of pandemic preparedness planning, car-
ried out at institutional, national and international levels. The dissection of pandemic preparedness 
planning is now in full swing.
Scholars of security studies have made vital contributions to that dissection, using pandemic 
preparedness policy to illustrate the rapid expansion of security agendas to incorporate health-
based threats (Cooper, 2008; Elbe, 2003, 2009, 2010b; Enemark, 2009; Lakoff and Collier, 2008; 
McInness and Lee, 2006; Rushton and Youde, 2014). The new notion of global health security has 
also formed the basis for detailed studies into the social dynamics and political implications of 
securitizing international health issues (Davies, 2008; Elbe, 2006, 2010a; McInnes and Rushton, 
2013). Further scholarship has attended to the play and proliferation of anticipatory logics in pan-
demic preparedness planning (Diprose et al., 2008; Lakoff, 2008; Whitehall, 2010), and has even 
explored pandemic flu as the manifestation of a new ‘preparedness’ paradigm in security policy 
(Anderson, 2010; Lakoff, 2008; Lakoff and Collier, 2008; Samimian-Darash, 2011, 2013; 
Stephenson and Jamieson, 2009).
One critical area of pandemic preparedness planning, however, has so far attracted compara-
tively little attention in security studies. Very few scholars have looked in detail at the material 
technologies that lie at the heart of the pandemic preparedness apparatus: pharmaceuticals. Novel 
pharmaceutical products – such as the antiviral medication Tamiflu – were widely identified by 
governments in Europe and around the world as the ‘first line of defence’ against pandemic threats, 
and as the cornerstone of 21st-century pandemic preparedness planning. The two frequently went 
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hand-in-hand, even to the extent that they often appeared synonymous with one another. All of a 
sudden, pharmaceuticals have thus become quite central to security policy. So, how did govern-
ments come to view pharmaceutical stockpiling as such an indispensable element of pandemic 
preparedness? What are the underlying security rationalities that rapidly rendered antivirals such a 
desirable option for government planners?
This article locates antiviral stockpiling within the emergence of a wider governmental econ-
omy of power shaping contemporary security policy. Drawing upon an in-depth reading of 
Foucault’s notion of a ‘crisis of circulation’, the article shows how the rapid and widespread rise of 
pharmaceutical stockpiling across Europe is integral to a governmental rationality of political rule 
concerned with managing an array of inherently circulatory threats to the welfare of populations 
– including their health. The article illustrates how a pandemic is a quintessential example of such 
a ‘crisis of circulation’. A pandemic is caused by the rapid international circulation of a potentially 
lethal virus, and is also amplified by an array of other circulatory systems – such as the interna-
tional aviation network. At the same time, a pandemic is a direct threat to all of those wider circula-
tory systems, because controlling the spread of the virus would lead to the drastic cessation of 
most, if not all, other forms of circulation – as fear takes hold and emergency public health inter-
ventions are implemented. Here, novel antiviral medications such as Tamiflu emerge as such an 
attractive policy option because they could mark a new way of modulating dangerous levels of 
(viral) circulation that – unlike vaccines – can be immediately deployed following the emergence 
of a new pandemic influenza virus. More than that, they form the one intervention that govern-
ments could use without having to disrupt all the other circulatory systems crucial for maintaining 
population welfare. The seductive political promise of antiviral stockpiles, in other words, is 
nothing less than the pharmaceutical securing of circulation itself.
A pharmaceutical epidemic: Antiviral stockpiling across Europe
The World Health Organization (WHO, 2007: 47) warns that a new pandemic infecting roughly 
25% of the world’s population (a figure derived from previous pandemics) would affect more than 
1.5 billion people and cause enormous social disruption due to a rapid surge in illnesses and deaths. 
Even in the ‘best case’ scenario of producing only relatively mild symptoms, a pandemic would 
create substantial healthcare costs and require governments to implement costly pandemic man-
agement plans – both of which could weaken the prospects of a recovery in the world economy 
(Smith et al., 2009). Those stark warnings have turned pandemic preparedness into a pressing 
political priority for countries in the European Union (EU) and around the world.
The need to respond to such microbial vulnerabilities is also animating a widening of security 
agendas to explicitly include a number of health-based threats (European Commission, 2009; 
WHO, 2007). So great is the importance that governments and other actors now attach to managing 
acute, transnational infectious disease threats that they have coined the new notion of ‘health secu-
rity’, which is now proliferating in a wide array of international policy debates and official docu-
ments (Elbe, 2009, 2010b; European Commission, 2009; European Council, 2008; Global Health 
Security Initiative (GHSI), 2002; World Health Assembly (WHA), 2001; WHO, 2007). The WHO 
(2007: ix) has even made the strengthening of health security one of its core strategic priorities for 
the coming years, defining it as ‘the activities required, both proactive and reactive, to minimize 
vulnerability to acute public health events that endanger the collective health of populations living 
across geographical regions and international boundaries’.
Echoing those international developments at the European level, the European Commission 
(2011) has similarly spent much of the past decade developing its own health security framework 
– focusing on the three pillars of prevention, preparedness and responses to threats. A new 
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agreement on strengthening EU health security reached at the end of 2013 extended the existing 
European coordination mechanism for communicable diseases to cover all health threats of bio-
logical, chemical, environmental and unknown origin. It also provided an institutional foundation 
for the EU Health Security Committee, which had been newly established as an informal commit-
tee after the 2001 anthrax letters in the United States. The draft decision even created a new legal 
basis for the (voluntary) joint procurement of pandemic vaccines – which is intended to help mem-
ber-states achieve lower prices and allow greater flexibility, and to create more equitable access 
given limited production capacities at the global level (EU, 2013).
That last element was not only a particularly complex area of diplomatic negotiation, but – more 
crucially – exemplifies just how central the procurement of pharmaceuticals has become for 
European security policy in the space of just a couple of years. It was only a few years ago – in 
2005, to be exact – that many governments across Europe first rushed to amass such vast pharma-
ceutical stockpiles for the purposes of strengthening health security. The arrival of dead birds 
infected with highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) at the eastern borders of the EU triggered 
that stockpiling frenzy, especially of antiviral medications such as Tamiflu (manufactured by 
Roche). As William Burns, head of Roche’s pharmaceuticals division, put it in October 2005: 
‘Following four ducks (that died) in Romania last weekend, Europe went mad. I don’t think you’ll 
find a single pack (of Tamiflu) in Paris. And this is not because we’ve had an influenza outbreak’ 
(cited in Turner, 2005). The epidemic of pharmaceutical stockpiling that would rapidly sweep 
across Europe had begun.
The year 2005 would also witness the first sustained runs on Tamiflu in several European coun-
tries. David Reddy, similarly working for Roche at the time, recalls how ‘in one country we sold 
within a week the amount that we would normally sell in an entire year! We had to give priority to 
government orders as well as ensure treatment of people during the regular influenza season’ (cited 
in Samii and Van Wassenhove, 2008: 7). Even though there was still no firm evidence that H5N1 
could spread efficiently between human beings (the precondition for a pandemic), governments 
across Europe scrambled to create sizeable stockpiles of antiviral medications in anticipation of an 
imminent threat. Anxious as to what may lie around the corner, governments became gripped by an 
almost effervescent frenzy as they now competed with one another to rapidly stockpile scarce 
global supplies of Tamiflu from the manufacturer. All the while, national policy planners were 
nervously looking over their shoulders at other member-states to see how much they were stockpil-
ing, keen to secure early deliveries and locking in orders before limited supplies ran out.
In hindsight, the pace and scale of the drive towards large-scale pharmaceutical stockpiling 
across most European countries is breathtaking. After studying pandemic preparedness plans 
across Europe in 2007, one expert concluded that ‘EU countries have so far bought close to half of 
all Tamiflu doses produced globally’ (Trakatellis, 2007: 22).
By 2007, countries such as France, Austria, Ireland, Luxemburg and Switzerland had reportedly 
set stockpiling targets in excess of 30% of the population, while countries such as the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Hong Kong, the United States, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, Malta, Spain, Portugal, 
Finland and Sweden set them in excess of 20% (Trakatellis, 2007: 23; see Figure 1). The trend 
towards large-scale antiviral stockpiling would continue apace during the following two years. By 
2009, a total of 95 governments around the world had reportedly purchased or ordered pandemic 
Tamiflu stockpiles.
All in all, Roche announced, around 350 million treatment courses (3.5 billion doses) were sup-
plied to governments worldwide between 2004 and 2009 alone (Reddy, 2010: 35–40). Although 
the exact price paid by governments remained confidential in most countries, the estimated cumu-
lative costs are likely to run into billions of euros across the member-states of the EU. If there is 
one anticipatory security practice that materially symbolizes the rise of pandemic preparedness 
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more than any other, it is surely this rapid surge to create vast new pharmaceutical stockpiles of 
antiviral medications. Indeed, the entire pandemic preparedness apparatus that has been erected 
over the past decade is unthinkable without the central role played by pharmaceuticals at the very 
heart of that structure.
The widespread move towards large-scale stockpiling of antivirals marks a novel development in 
European security policy in three respects. First, and as we will explore in further detail later, these 
antiviral medications represent an entirely new class of medicines called neuraminidase inhibitors. 
Although older types of antivirals were used for treating influenza infection in prior decades, the 
Figure 1. Government antiviral stockpiling levels in August 2007, as reported by Roche 
Source: Trakatellis 2007: 23.
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development of this new class of neuraminidase inhibitors was dependent on quite significant sci-
entific and technological advances in virology, biochemistry and pharmacology. Neuraminidase 
inhibitors such as Tamiflu were only developed commercially as recently as the mid- to late 1990s, 
and did not receive regulatory approval in Europe until 2002. First and foremost, neuraminidase 
inhibitors such as Tamiflu therefore constitute a new and previously unavailable pharmaceutical 
intervention that governments could have at their disposal for pandemic preparedness planning. 
They would no longer have to rely solely on the much older vaccine technology.
Second, those antiviral stockpiles also represent a new – or at least augmented – societal deploy-
ment of pharmaceuticals. While pharmaceuticals have been routinely used in medical care for 
decades, the significance and function of antiviral stockpiles stretch beyond the confines of routine 
healthcare, trespassing deeply into the domain of national security policy. In fact, antivirals such as 
Tamiflu have become part of a whole new discursive category of medicines labelled ‘medical coun-
termeasures’ – a term reserved for precisely those pharmaceuticals such as Tamiflu that exist at the 
intersection of health and security policy, and that can be made available to the civilian population 
during an emergency. The augmented security significance of those medications also goes some 
way towards explaining why – physically – antiviral stockpiles are often kept separate from other 
medicines destined for use in routine healthcare. In many European countries, the creation of these 
antiviral stockpiles led to the identification of novel spaces for storing them, while in some coun-
tries (including the United States) the packaging of the capsules for pandemic use was also changed 
to indicate their special pandemic preparedness role. In most instances, such antivirals are now 
stored in large, separate warehouses capable of maintaining the required environmental conditions. 
Those warehouses have special security arrangements in place to protect their contents in the event 
of a pandemic, which is also why the precise location of these warehouses remains secret in most 
countries. The fact that these antivirals are now deliberately acquired for broader security pur-
poses, and with security considerations expressly in mind, marks a second novel aspect of those 
pharmaceutical stockpiles.
Finally, antiviral stockpiles also represent a significant development within the much longer his-
tory of strategic stockpiling. Historians trace the broader practice of stockpiling back at least 4000 
years, usually on the basis of a reference in the Old Testament to Egypt building a stockpile of food 
equal to two years of normal consumption (National Research Council (NRC), 2008: 133). There is 
nothing new about stockpiling, per se. There is, to be sure, also a considerable history of stockpiling 
strategic resources crucial to maintaining a war effort during the Cold War (Snyder, 1966). Yet those 
20th-century precedents of national stockpiling were predominantly focused on minerals and other 
strategic goods required for sustaining combat operations, or on keeping the economy afloat – as in 
the case of the creation of oil reserves in 1973 following the energy crisis of that year.
The recently established antiviral stockpiles stand out against the backdrop of this longer his-
torical experience of stockpiling because they are devoted specifically, and even exclusively, to 
medicines and pharmaceuticals. They are part of a wider biological turn in security policy where, 
as Melinda Cooper (2008: 75) argues, ‘the frontier between warfare and public health, microbial 
life and bioterrorism [has] become strategically indifferent’. With the rise of the twin biological 
threats of pandemics and bioterrorism, the kinds of materials now deemed crucial to national secu-
rity are not confined to those narrowly related to military efforts, or even to the broader mainte-
nance of the economy – but also include the overall health of the population. Security policy needs 
‘to arm itself against the generic microbiological threat, from wherever it might emerge’ (Cooper, 
2008: 75). Pharmaceuticals are emerging as the weapon of choice.
Yet no sooner had governments begun to create those towering pharmaceutical stockpiles than 
the whole practice quickly became embroiled in a number of intense public controversies. Many of 
those controversies were triggered by the unexpectedly mild experience of the 2009 H1N1 outbreak. 
The 2009 H1N1 pandemic was ‘unexpectedly’ mild in the sense that the morbidity and mortality 
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rates of the virus did not nearly mirror the ways in which a future flu pandemic had been widely 
predicted by a number of elaborate socio-economic models, as well as the dramatic large-scale 
simulation exercises in which many public officials had participated. Nor, of course, did the experi-
ence of H1N1 in 2009 and 2010 match the way in which the catastrophic experience of pandemics 
had been more publicly premediated in a series of popular fiction novels and blockbuster films – 
from Outbreak and 28 Days Later, all the way through to Contagion (Aradau and Van Munster, 
2011; De Goede, 2008). A public backlash against these antiviral stockpiles soon ensued.
Today, probing questions are being openly raised as to whether the initial expenditure on these 
antiviral stockpiles was ever justified in the first place (National Audit Office (NAO), 2013). 
Investigative journalists have expressed disquiet about whether the commercial interests of large 
pharmaceutical companies may have unduly influenced the political decisionmaking leading up to 
the creation of these stockpiles – especially in the United States government and at the WHO 
(Cohen and Carter, 2010; Stanton, 2005). All the while, Tamiflu has also found itself at the eye of 
a much larger political storm about insufficient public access to detailed clinical trial data that is 
used to demonstrate the efficacy and safety of new drugs in general. This latter dimension has been 
the subject of intensive scrutiny by groups – such as the Cochrane Collaboration – who conduct 
systematic reviews of the evidence base for the efficacy of drugs (Jefferson et al., 2010). In many 
ways, antiviral stockpiling has now become as controversial as it has been pervasive in Europe.
Security, circulation and governmentality
Given the enduring public controversy surrounding Tamiflu, how did governments first come to 
view pharmaceutical stockpiling as such an indispensable element of pandemic preparedness plan-
ning? What are the underlying political rationalities that rendered pharmaceutical stockpiling such 
an attractive policy response for governments across Europe? Taking a broadly genealogical per-
spective, at least three crucial transformations in the rationalization of government had to occur for 
this recent ‘epidemic’ of pharmaceutical stockpiling to unfold across Europe. Those transforma-
tions are described in Michel Foucault’s (2007) influential and well-known lecture series on the 
emergence of a new form of political rationality he called ‘governmentality’.
First, and again viewed in a much longer historical perspective, security policy would have to become 
broadly concerned with improving the welfare of populations – rather than just with the more narrow 
task of securing the rulers and their power. This, Foucault famously argued, is one of the key features of 
the new ‘governmental’ economy of power that began to emerge in Europe from the 18th century, and 
that rationalizes political rule precisely around a new political object of the ‘population’. The ‘popula-
tion will appear above all else as the final end of government’, and it now ‘appears as the end and instru-
ment of government rather than as the sovereign’s strength’ (Foucault, 2007: 105). From that point 
onwards, political rule is increasingly articulated with a view to ‘improv[ing] the condition of the popu-
lation, to increas[ing] its wealth, its longevity, and its health’ (Foucault, 2007: 105). Pharmaceutical 
stockpiling is integral to this political rationality because it is intended – and legitimated publicly – as a 
way of protecting the welfare of populations. Indeed, the very reason those stockpiles are built on such 
a large scale is to make it possible to extend antiviral protections to the population as a whole.
Second, security policy would also have to directly encompass care for the underlying biological 
dynamics shaping population welfare. Security could not be confined to protecting and defending 
the territory of the state, or even organizing the material enrichment of society; it would also have 
to become intimately concerned with managing the complex biological processes affecting popula-
tions. Here, Foucault traced how the ‘population’ comes to be partially understood as a biological 
mass, the statistical analysis of which reveals that the population is constituted by ‘living beings, 
traversed, commanded, ruled by processes and biological laws. A population has a birth rate, a rate 
of mortality, a population has an age curve, a generation pyramid, a life-expectancy, a state of health, 
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a population can perish or, on the contrary, grow’ (Foucault, [1981] 2007: 161). Designed to protect 
the health of populations from the biological threat of infectious disease, pharmaceutical stockpiles 
are integral to a political rationality that also encompasses the active management of biological 
dynamics underlying the population (Foucault, 1976: 142–143).
That said, there are plainly very many different diseases affecting the health of populations – 
most of which are dealt with through private or national systems of healthcare. Only very few, if 
any, of those other diseases have prompted the same large-scale creation of pharmaceutical stock-
piles in the way that the threat of pandemic influenza has recently witnessed. What is it about the 
threat of pandemic flu in particular that necessitates such an extraordinary policy response? The 
intensified political problematization of circulation is a third genealogical transformation in the 
rationalization of political rule that becomes relevant here.
To illustrate this crucial dimension of governmentality, Foucault first contrasted it with the older 
form of sovereign power. Sovereign power largely revolved around rulers wishing to hold onto 
their territory and trying to conquer new territory. In that historical context, security was always a 
problem of the security of territory and of the sovereign who rules over the territory, trying to 
ensure: ‘How can it not change, or how can I advance it without it changing? How can the territory 
be demarcated, fixed, protected, or enlarged?’ (Foucault, 2007: 64–65). In the sovereign economy 
of power, security was principally concerned with pinning things down, keeping things stable, and 
with making sure things do not circulate.
The newer governmental economy of power emerging in 18th-century Europe, by contrast, 
sought to achieve pretty much the opposite: it tries to preserve and even incite circulation under-
stood ‘in the very broad sense of movement, exchange, and contact, as form of dispersion and also 
as form of distribution’ (Foucault, 2007: 65). The art of political rule comes to consist of managing 
circulation and ensuring that everything remains in motion in order to maximize the prosperity and 
welfare of the population (Foucault, 2007: 65). Government begins ‘more or less [to] turn on the 
problem of circulation’ (Foucault, 2007: 64). Liberalism would emerge here as a crucial political 
rationality and technology for inciting such circulation – with its incessant critique of excessive 
government, as well as its emphasis on governing precisely by
not interfering, allowing free movement, letting things follow their course; laisser faire, passer et aller – 
basically and fundamentally means acting so that reality develops, goes its way, and follows its own course 
according to the laws, principles, and mechanisms of reality itself. (Foucault, 2007: 48–49)
In the era of governmentality, political rule becomes increasingly concerned with allowing, ena-
bling, facilitating and inciting circulation.
This wider problematization of circulation would also begin to penetrate and shape security 
policy. At the most immediate level, one could broadly say that in the era of governmentality secu-
rity policy too becomes much more intimately concerned with regulating, or sorting, various sys-
tems of circulation – the circulation of people, of weapons, of finance, of pollution, and so forth. 
The problem of security is now
no longer that of fixing and demarcating the territory, but of allowing circulations to take place, of 
controlling them, sifting the good and the bad, ensuring that things are always in movement, constantly 
moving around, continually going from one point to another, but in such a way that the inherent dangers 
of this circulation are cancelled out. (Foucault, 2007: 65)
Put more succinctly, security policy comes to be more intimately concerned with ‘how should 
things circulate or not circulate?’ and with sorting out the ‘good’ from the ‘bad’ circulation 
(Foucault, 2007: 65; see also Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008).
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Yet a careful reading of Foucault’s lecture series Security, Territory, Population indicates that this 
observation really only begins to scratch the surface of the complicated relationship between circu-
lation and security. In fact, that relationship runs much deeper than merely sorting the ‘good’ circu-
lation from the ‘bad’ circulation (defined broadly in terms of how it impacts the welfare of the 
population). The transition towards a governmental economy of power will also give rise to a whole 
new category – or class – of security threats. For there will be specific circulatory systems that have 
a natural tendency to spiral out of control in a way that directly undermines population welfare. 
Foucault argued that such an inherently unstable system of circulation, which could not simply be 
left to circulate freely, begins to constitute a new kind of ‘crisis’. Indeed, a crisis would now come 
to consist precisely of any ‘phenomenon of sudden, circular bolting that can only be checked either 
by a higher, natural mechanism, or by an artificial intervention’ (Foucault, 2007: 61). Those new 
‘crises’ of circulation are the correlative of a particular way of rationalizing political rule according 
to the principles of liberalism and laisser faire. They effectively represent the ‘dark side’ of a ration-
alization of political rule bent on allowing the free play of social dynamics and constantly seeking 
to stimulate circulation (Elbe, 2007, 2012).
With the rise of the era of governmentality, then, security policy becomes about more than just 
the traditional geopolitical games of territorial influence. It also becomes about managing circula-
tion and sorting the ‘good’ from the ‘bad’ circulation. More still, it becomes concerned with iden-
tifying precisely those social phenomena that cannot be left to circulate freely lest they spiral out 
of control and begin to threaten the welfare of the population. Such ‘crises of circulation’ would 
increasingly come to find their place on the security agenda alongside more traditional concerns 
surrounding the deployment of armed force in the international system. Indeed, the proper art of 
practising security would come to consist not just of responding to those circulatory crises once 
they emerge, but of proactively anticipating and preparing for their emergence. Security policy 
would have to operate in relation to an essentially contingent and open ‘future that is not exactly 
controllable, not precisely measured or measurable and that … takes into account precisely what 
might happen’ (Foucault, 2007: 20). It will ‘try to plan a milieu in terms of events or series of 
events or possible elements, of series that will have to be regulated within a multivalent and trans-
formable framework’ (Foucault, 2007: 20). As we will see next, that incessant and anticipatory 
problematization of circulation also lies at the heart of pandemic preparedness. For what is a pan-
demic if not the quintessential example of a crisis of circulation?
Pandemics: A crisis of (viral) circulation
Pandemic threats are deeply imbricated with the problem of circulation. First, pandemic influenza is an 
inherently circulatory threat in that it is caused by a potentially lethal virus that first passes (in all likeli-
hood) from animals to humans, and then circulates between human beings – each of whom may go on 
to infect yet more people, so enabling the virus to become epidemic and eventually pandemic. A pan-
demic is essentially an unpredictable and dangerous system of viral circulation. As Angus Nicoll, head 
of the influenza programme at the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) puts it:
European policy-makers and politicians are put in a hard place by the prospect of modern influenza pandemics. 
They don’t know when one is going to happen, where it will start or what it will be like. The only certainty is 
that future influenza pandemics will occur and they will be unpredictable. (Nicoll and Sprenger, 2011)
A pandemic thus emerges as a system of ‘bad’ circulation directly threatening the welfare of the 
population by potentially causing very widespread morbidity and mortality, as well as an array of 
wider social, economic and political impacts.
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Again, however, we are just scratching the surface of the multifaceted relationship between 
circulation and pandemic threats. After all, such systems of ‘bad’ circulation abound. Why have 
pandemic threats attracted such a particularly intense political salience in many European countries 
– to the point where in the United Kingdom’s National Security Strategies, for example, pandemic 
threats are ranked as a (top) Tier 1 threat on a par with terrorism? Pandemic flu has such deep trac-
tion as a security threat because it also sits at the very nexus and interspaces of so many other 
systems of circulation – of viruses, of animals and livestock, of trade, of food, of people, of chil-
dren, of airplanes, and so forth. A pandemic is a system of circulation intimately connected to 
almost all other systems of circulation that are crucial to maintaining population welfare. Because 
viruses reside and replicate inside the human body, they cannot be easily separated from all those 
other circulations – giving influenza viruses the potential to rapidly expand around the world. Its 
location at the heart of so many different circulatory systems means that the virus will rapidly lead 
to ‘multiplying cases that multiply other cases in an unstoppable tendency or gradient’ as they 
begin to affect an ever-growing range of circulatory systems (Foucault, 2007: 61). Could there be 
a more telling contemporary example of the ‘phenomenon of sudden, circular bolting’ to which 
Foucault (2007: 61) referred?
Yet the relationship between circulation and pandemic threats gets more complicated still, for the 
perceived risk of a pandemic only increases the more all these other systems of circulation are fur-
ther intensified, speeded up and extended in geographic scope – for example, through the rapid 
expansion of international air travel. As Gro Harlem Brundtland (2003: 417), the former Director 
General of the WHO, put it in an article on global health security:
today, in an interconnected world, bacteria and viruses travel almost as fast as e-mail and financial flows. 
Globalization has connected Bujumbura to Bombay and Bangkok to Boston. There are no health 
sanctuaries…. Problems halfway around the world become everyone’s problem. 
Pandemics are thus often understood as the unintended ‘blowback’ – or even as the epidemiological 
footprint – of intensified globalization (Elbe, 2007, 2012). The reason pandemic threats strike at the 
very heart of a governmental rationality is because the risk of their materialization is only increased 
by all the government efforts to incite, intensify and extend circulation. The more circulation is 
intensified, the greater the risk of a new pandemic emerging – as human contacts are multiplied, 
animal habitats become encroached upon and movements are accelerated.
Still we have not captured the deepest threat posed by a pandemic to a governmental economy of 
power; for one of the most significant social effects of a pandemic, when it does emerge, is that it 
begins to abruptly cancel out all the other systems of circulation crucial to maintaining population 
welfare – such as the movement of goods, of people, of services, and so forth. Containing or at least 
mitigating a pandemic creates immense social and political pressure to introduce travel restrictions, 
the closure of schools and the cancelling of large-scale gatherings such as sports events and so forth. 
Even where such public health measures are resisted, recent experiences with SARS and H5N1 
indicate that the fear they induce alone can have much the same effect – crippling trade, restaurant 
visits, public and commercial transport, and so forth as people shun public places to minimize the 
risk of becoming infected. Beyond the individual morbidity and mortality pandemics cause, the 
principal social effect of a pandemic is that it ends up inhibiting, reducing and stifling a range of 
other circulatory processes. Yes, a pandemic is a circulatory threat; yes, a pandemic is a system of 
‘bad’ viral circulation; yes, a pandemic is fanned by a host of other circulatory systems; and yes, the 
emergence of a pandemic is a threat that only becomes greater the more that circulation is intensi-
fied. However, the ultimate effect of a pandemic is also that it ends up shutting down all other 
 by guest on July 30, 2014sdi.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Elbe et al.: Securing circulation pharmaceutically 11
systems of circulation, leading to stasis. A pandemic is the quintessential ‘crisis of circulation’ 
because it is a circulatory threat to the very notion of circulation itself.
Beyond vaccines: Securing circulation pharmaceutically
What can governments do to protect populations against pandemic threats? Is there, to remain with 
Foucault’s (2007: 61) terminology just a little bit longer, any ‘higher, natural mechanism’ or ‘arti-
ficial intervention’ that governments could adopt in order to secure their populations against the 
emergence of such a crisis of (viral) circulation? The traditional mechanism that Foucault himself 
referred to in his lecture series Security, Territory, Population was vaccination. Reflecting on the 
threat posed by smallpox in the 18th century, Foucault argued that the discovery of a vaccine meant 
that the problem of smallpox could now be contained through a ‘higher, natural mechanism’ – in 
this case, the human immune system. By exposing people in advance to small doses of the disease, 
the natural human immune system could develop new antibodies, allowing people to quickly fight 
off future infections – and before the infectious disease could take hold in the population as a 
whole. Of course, the introduction of vaccination during this historical period still predated the 
modern germ theory of disease, as well as our contemporary understanding of the workings of the 
human immune system. At the time, vaccination in fact stood completely apart from, and very 
much outside, accepted medical knowledge. It was not even known how or why the practice of 
vaccination worked. It was simply a matter of trial and error and empirical record that it did 
(Foucault, 2007: 58).
The fact that it evidently worked meant that one could now raise additional statistical questions 
about what chances an individual had to succumb to smallpox, or to acquire smallpox when vac-
cinated, and indeed how the vaccine would affect the distribution of the disease in the population, 
and so forth. The availability of vaccines thus gave rise to a new logic of managing infectious 
diseases that was not based on the sovereign principle of exclusion, as was historically the case 
with leprosy, where those infected were simply excluded physically from society. Nor was it the 
disciplinary logic of quarantine, as had been the case with plague in the Middle Ages. Instead, it 
was the question of efficiently managing smallpox and keeping it within socially and economically 
acceptable limits by stimulating a ‘higher, natural mechanism’ through vaccines to contain its 
circulation (Foucault, 2007: 10).
Foucault’s discussion implicitly recognizes just how desirable vaccines are to governments as a 
technology for managing the problem of infectious diseases. They are preventative, can have a 
high rate of success, and can be extended to the entire population without major material or eco-
nomic difficulties (Foucault, 2007: 58). In addition – returning to the threat of pandemic flu today 
– we can see that vaccines also continue to remain the most desirable intervention against pan-
demic flu for many governments. According to the WHO (2009), ‘vaccines are among the most 
important medical interventions for reducing illness and deaths’ available today. In an ‘ideal’ 
world, many governments would thus like to acquire the capacity to routinely vaccinate their popu-
lations against the threat of pandemic influenza, and would then no longer have to worry about the 
destabilizing threat it poses. All kinds of flows and systems of circulation could continue to unfold 
unfettered.
Unfortunately, there is a major catch when it comes to vaccines for influenza. Precisely because 
vaccines work through the advance stimulation of the human immune system (provoking it to cre-
ate new antibodies), they have to be virus-specific in order to be effective. In the case of pandemic 
flu this is a major problem, because influenza viruses are constantly changing and evolving. The 
incessant circulation of influenza viruses also fans their continuing mutation and evolution. Even 
vaccinating citizens for seasonal flu requires constant monitoring of the evolution of influenza 
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viruses circulating around the world, as well as a considerable amount of educated guesswork to 
predict which strands of the virus are likely to be circulating in the next flu season so as to mass 
produce the correct type of vaccine.
This problem is exacerbated in the case of pandemic flu because – by definition – it is not possible 
to know in advance exactly what form a new virus might take. A pandemic is usually caused not by 
a virus that evolves gradually from season to season (genetic ‘drift’), but by one that entails a more 
substantial recombination of viral material (genetic ‘shift’) to which humans may have much less or 
even no prior immunity. This makes it extremely difficult to develop a preventative vaccine prior to 
any flu pandemic. Nor can governments simply wait for a new virus to emerge and then quickly mass 
produce a new vaccine. In the current model of vaccine production, it would take at least six to nine 
months to mass produce any new vaccine. Even countries that have their own domestic vaccine-
production capabilities (and most countries in the world do not) would have to endure the effects of 
a pandemic for many months without the widespread availability of a vaccine for the population. 
Even then, there would not be enough international supply to meet global demand.
The unsavoury and thorny dilemma that pandemic flu therefore poses for governments is as 
follows. Either they would effectively have to choose to let the virus run its course for months 
while they wait for new vaccine to become gradually available – with all the wider social, eco-
nomic, political and health implications that would entail – in which case governments would also 
risk being seen as weak and even negligent in their core duty to protect the welfare of their popula-
tions. Or, they would have to fall back on a disciplinary economy of power and implement a range 
of much more ‘draconian’ public health measures aimed at curtailing the movement of people in 
the hope of reducing human contacts – such as school closures, cancelling public events, quaran-
tine, isolation, and so forth. Like the first option, however, that course of action would also have 
the effect of shutting down most systems of circulation within the population and drastically under-
mining its overall welfare. The interventions would not be that much more desirable than the 
underlying problem they are intended to address.
Antivirals are attractive to governments because they could offer a partial way out of this 
thorny dilemma. Antivirals were commercially developed during the late 1990s as an alternative 
way of managing the circulation of influenza viruses in the population. Unlike vaccines, antivi-
rals do not stimulate the human immune system in advance of infection so that the human 
immune system can then neutralize new cases of infection in future. Instead, this new generation 
of pharmaceuticals seeks to directly interfere in a targeted way with the molecular processes of 
viral circulation that take place inside the human body. It is a well-known fact that viruses – 
including influenza viruses – cannot replicate by themselves. In order to replicate, they need to 
insert themselves into existing cells, and then use those cells to make more copies of themselves. 
The newly formed virus particles then leave the cell again, destroying the host cell in the process 
and going on to infect neighbouring cells – repeating the cycle over and over again (Schneider, 
2001). In evolutionary terms, it is an elegant and sophisticated process, albeit one that also has a 
‘catch’. As the viruses leave the host cell, they become attached to a coating of sialic acid found 
on the surface of the host cell. They thus require an enzyme – called neuraminidase – in order to 
dissolve this ‘sticky’ acid and to free themselves so that they can go on to infect further cells 
(Schneider, 2001). Without this enzyme, the new virus particles would simply remain stuck on 
the host cell with nowhere to go.
If there were a way to artificially disrupt, or inhibit, the working of this neuraminidase enzyme 
in the human body, it could mark an entry point for a new type of pharmaceutical intervention – a 
neuraminidase inhibitor. Tamiflu (oseltamivir) – and a closely related predecessor drug called 
Relenza (zanamivir) – are two attempts to capitalize on recent advances in virology, biochemistry 
and pharmacology in order to deliberately and rationally design a new, artificial pharmacological 
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compound that would be capable of ‘blocking’ this enzyme so crucial to viral circulation. These 
new antivirals do not actively destroy viruses in the way that many antibiotics destroy bacteria; 
however, they do promise to slow the process of viral replication inside the human body, barring 
viruses from releasing themselves and going on to affect new cells. That is also why they must 
generally be taken within 48 hours after the onset of symptoms, that is, before the viral infection 
has multiplied too pervasively in the human body.
These antivirals represent a new type of pharmaceutical intervention for directly modulating the 
circulation of influenza viruses in the population. More importantly still, they promise govern-
ments the option of selectively limiting the circulation of influenza viruses in the population with-
out having to resort to the imposition of more ‘draconian’ public health measures that end up 
inhibiting other systems of circulation. As the Chief Scientist and Head of the Office of the Chief 
Scientist at the ECDC Professor Johan Giesecke (2012) explained in an interview:
The classical measures for public health – isolation, quarantine, mass vaccination … there is clearly an 
increasing resistance in the population to these more drastic public health measures…. It would be 
impossible today [to do mass isolation] because people would say why, I don’t want to, is this necessary, 
where is your data? … The classical public health measures would be questioned much more than they 
were 50 years ago…. This makes medical countermeasures more important today. You cannot politically 
do a cordon sanitaire anymore. It would probably be impossible.1
Antivirals, in other words, are the one ‘artificial’ intervention that governments could potentially 
deploy during a new influenza pandemic without having to disrupt all the other systems of circula-
tion crucial for population welfare – such as children going to school, business trading, people 
travelling, and so forth. The use of antivirals promised governments the ability to largely sidestep 
many of the more traditional, restrictive and unpopular public health measures, and to allow all of 
these wider systems to continue circulating in the event of a pandemic. The seductive political 
promise of antiviral stockpiles, in other words, is nothing less than the pharmaceutical securing of 
circulation itself. And, in the case of Tamiflu, it could be as easy as popping a pill.
Stockpiling for preparedness: Taking Tamiflu out of circulation
As Tamiflu begun to emerge as a new and crucial ‘first line of defence’ for pandemic flu, one key 
question remained: Would governments be able to secure sufficient quantities of antivirals during 
a pandemic? Put differently, would a laisser faire approach lead to the correct alignment between 
the volumes of available and required antivirals during a pandemic, or would this too necessitate 
some kind of ‘artificial’ advance intervention by governments? Based on the historical experience 
of pandemics, most preparedness plans envisioned needing supply levels capable of treating around 
a quarter of the population – although some countries set targets in excess of 50% of the popula-
tion. As governments drew up their pandemic preparedness plans, it became clear that a policy of 
laisser faire would not, in fact, generate the required volumes of antivirals under pandemic 
circumstances.
Part of the reason for a likely shortfall has to do with the political economy of antiviral produc-
tion. The manufacturer of Tamiflu (Roche) repeatedly warned governments that in the event of a 
pandemic it was unlikely that there would be sufficient existing or spare capacity in the supply 
chains to make large quantities available. According to Mike McGuire, vice president of anti-
infectives for Roche at the time, ‘once an outbreak occurs or a pandemic flu starts spreading, it will 
be impossible to meet immediate and widespread demand for Tamiflu’ (cited in Continuity Central, 
2012). This factor is compounded by the fact that a pandemic would likely lead to a rapid surge in 
 by guest on July 30, 2014sdi.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
14 Security Dialogue 
demand, as countries around the world would all seek to acquire large amounts of the medicine 
simultaneously.
Nor, Roche warned further, could governments simply wait for commercial production to be 
rapidly scaled up following the onset of a pandemic. Roche representatives briefed governments 
about how complex the Tamiflu production process is, that it is dangerous in parts, and that it 
involves a series of complicated steps. What is more, it is a pharmacological property of neurami-
nidase inhibitors that they must be administered within 48 hours of the onset of symptoms in order 
to have a significant effect. In terms of making these antivirals available to the population at large, 
governments and authorities would thus require not just large-scale access to the medication, but 
also rapid access to the medicine in order to make it available before it is too late. Some kind of 
artificial mechanism would be needed to align the correct levels of viral and antiviral circulation in 
the immediate aftermath of a pandemic.
In a context of limited international production capability and the extraneous demands that a 
pandemic would pose, the only way to guarantee such rapid access to large quantities of antiviral 
medications was to create a spare cache of medicines that would be kept on ‘stand-by’ for a future 
pandemic.2 Governments, in short, would need to amass the desired quantities of antivirals in 
advance. So, the practice of pharmaceutical stockpiling was born, rapidly spreading across Europe 
(and beyond), not unlike an epidemic itself. It turned out – rather ironically in the end – that the 
only way to secure circulation pharmaceutically was by first taking a large number of antivirals out 
of circulation, deliberately confining them to those vast and highly secure warehouses that began 
to pop up across Europe. In the case of pandemic threats, the political art of preparedness came to 
revolve around determining which flows governments would have to deliberately immobilize and 
sacrifice in order to secure circulation at large.
Conclusion: The pharmaceuticalization of security
Prompted by the public controversies surrounding Tamiflu, this article explored the political ration-
alities underpinning the rapid rise of antiviral stockpiling across Europe. Drawing upon an in-depth 
reading of Foucault’s notion of a ‘crisis of circulation’, it showed how pharmaceutical stockpiling 
was integral to a governmental rationality of political rule continuously seeking to anticipate 
myriad circulatory threats to the welfare of populations – including biological threats to their over-
all levels of health. Novel antiviral medications such as Tamiflu emerged as such an attractive 
policy option because they could allow governments to rapidly modulate dangerous levels of 
(viral) circulation without disrupting all the other circulatory systems crucial for maintaining popu-
lation welfare. Antiviral stockpiles, in short, promised nothing less than a pharmaceutical securing 
of circulation itself.
Yet this trend towards large-scale antiviral stockpiling only represents the most public manifes-
tation when it comes to the growing centrality that pharmaceuticals are acquiring in contemporary 
security policy. Beyond the antivirals discussed here, there are many further attempts by govern-
ments to develop, acquire and stockpile a range of other medical countermeasures against the 
threat of bioterrorism – ranging from next-generation vaccines and antibiotics through to other 
antivirals and anti-toxins. A whole host of new initiatives, and even entire new institutions, have 
been recently developed for this task. Today, the quest to secure populations is no longer effected 
solely through the conventional security technologies tied up with the deployment of armed force 
in the international system. Increasingly, it is also carried out through the proactive acquisition and 
stockpiling of a range of pharmaceutical products. Pharmaceutical reason is beginning to penetrate 
contemporary security policy much more widely.
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This trend towards pharmaceutical solutions is not even confined to the field of security policy. 
Scholars from other disciplines, especially in sociology and anthropology, are tracking and expos-
ing a much wider proliferation of pharmaceutical logics, imaginaries and strategies throughout 
different sections of society. Working with the concept of ‘pharmaceuticalization’, they observe a 
pronounced increase in recourse to pharmaceutical products across many different areas of social 
life (Clarke et al., 2010; Lakoff, 2005; Petryna et al., 2007; Whyte et al., 2002; Williams et al., 
2009). The trend towards pharmaceutical stockpiling in security policy therefore needs to be situ-
ated within a much broader social context in which pharmaceuticals are being used much more 
widely, by more people, and for a more extensive range of conditions and afflictions (Abraham, 
2010, 2011; Williams et al., 2009, 2011).
What is animating all these pharmaceuticalization processes? The drivers already identified in 
the wider social science literature include biomedical advances, which are enabling novel therapies 
to be developed. The broader medicalization of existence is undoubtedly another important driver. 
Similarly, more aggressive industry promotion, including direct-to-consumer advertising, can 
increase demand for pharmaceutical products (Abraham, 2010; Williams et al., 2011). The analysis 
of antiviral stockpiling carried out here suggests that, when it comes to understanding the contem-
porary dynamics of pharmaceuticalization, we also need to be attentive to the underlying rationali-
ties of political rule within which pharmaceuticals are emerging as such attractive policy options 
for governments.
This ‘pharmaceuticalization’ of security is fascinating, in the end, because it transforms our 
bodies into crucial sites of security policy. Of course, in one way or another, our bodies have 
always been central sites for security practice – at least for as long as people have been fighting 
wars and waging battles. Yet there is also something deeper unfolding in this pharmaceuticalization 
of security, something that goes beyond Foucault’s own distinction between the anatamo (or disci-
plinary) politics of the human body and the biopolitics of the population. The pharmaceuticaliza-
tion of security pushes security policy much further into the interstices of the corporal body, 
descending to the more minute level of the complex immunological systems driving our biological 
existence. The pharmaceuticalization of security is transforming the inner molecular workings of 
all of our bodies – and not just the bodies of soldiers – into the new battlefields of security policy. 
Or, to put it more succinctly, it is beginning to turn the subject of security into a patient.
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